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1 Introduction
Introspection suggests that, in the real world, agents are often not certain of the proba-
bilities of the different possible outcomes of an action. In decision theories motivated
by this consideration, decision makers are said to perceive ambiguity if they are uncer-
tain about the probability distribution governing the contingent states on which the
consequences of given actions depend. Numerous experimental studies, largely built
on Ellsberg (1961)’s classic examples, show that subjects’ behavior is often sensitive to
ambiguity (for reviews see e.g. Camerer and Weber 1992; Trautmann and van de Kuilen
2016; Wakker 2010). For instance, subjects may display an ambiguity-averse attitude:
intuitively put, being inclined to shade evaluations of acts whose consequences are less
robust to the perceived ambiguity. In this paper, we report an experimental investiga-
tion in which we measure the strength of ambiguity sensitivity, and how that strength
is distributed across the sampled population.
This is timely for wider developments in the economics of uncertainty because
there is now a large and rapidly growing theoretical literature—surveyed, for exam-
ple, in Etner et al. (2012), Gilboa and Marinacci (2013) and Mukerji and Tallon
(2004)—that formalizes ambiguity sensitive preferences in different ways and applies
them in economic models. Yet, the importance of theoretical demonstrations of pos-
sible economic consequences of ambiguity sensitivity presumably depends on the
strength of the sensitivity. For example, even if many agents are ambiguity-averse,
that fact probably would not affect their behavior much if the aversion is very weak.
And, it is not just the average level of sensitivity that matters, but also the distribu-
tion. For example, if some agents are (economically) significantly ambiguity-seeking
and others significantly ambiguity-averse, this would give rise to richer possibilities
for trade in asset markets than if the only ambiguity sensitivity was ambiguity aver-
sion.
For these reasons, we quantify ambiguity sensitivity at the individual level. Though
we are not the first to do so, our approach is distinctive in both the measure used
and the form of ambiguity considered. As we explain, our measure has a more nat-
ural economic interpretation and our experimental design captures better important
features of ambiguity in the real world, namely that agents are often neither com-
pletely informed nor completely uninformed about probabilities and may differ in
their information.
We measure the strength of ambiguity sensitivity by inferring, from the choices
a subject makes, the ambiguity premium she associates with a given ambiguous act.
The notion of ambiguity premium is analogous to that of risk premium. An agent’s
risk premium for a lottery is its expected value minus the agent’s certainty equivalent.
Equivalently, it is the certainty equivalent of a hypothetical risk neutral agent minus that
of the real agent, with the hypothetical agent assumed to have the same information as
the real one. Thus, intuitively, the risk premium is the amount that a (risk averse) agent
shades off the valuation of a lottery because of his attitude to risk. By an analogous
intuition, the ambiguity premium is the amount that an (ambiguity-averse) agent shades
off the valuation of an ambiguous act because of his attitude to its perceived ambiguity.
More precisely, it is a hypothetical ambiguity-neutral agent’s certainty equivalent
for the act minus that of the real agent, with—importantly—the hypothetical agent
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assumed to share the actual agent’s subjective information and attitude to objective
risk. The need to attribute the same subjective information and risk attitude to the real
and hypothetical agents gives rise to key features of our design and approach.
Several reasons commend this concept of ambiguity premium as a useful measure
of ambiguity sensitivity. First, an agent’s ambiguity premium is easily compared with
their risk premium in terms of how much it shades off the expected value of an act,
allowing the relative importance of the two attitudes to be assessed. Such assessment is
important, to inform priorities in economic modelling. Second, although some model
must be applied to compute the ambiguity premium, the concept of the premium
makes no reference to any model, as we have just indicated, and is a monetary sum. In
this respect, the measure contrasts with model specific ambiguity attitude parameters
from the theoretical literature whose values are not portable across classes of pref-
erences. For example, magnitudes of the parameter(s) governing ambiguity attitude
in the smooth ambiguity model (Klibanoff et al. 2005) cannot be meaningfully com-
pared with α in the α-MEU model (Ghirardato et al. 2004). Moreover, “more ambiguity
averse”, an ordering on preferences that underlies the interpretation of ambiguity atti-
tude parameters, requires that preferences may be so ordered only if they share the
same risk attitude (Epstein 1999; Ghirardato and Marinacci 2002). Comparisons of
ambiguity premia are not limited in this way. Third, as Trautmann and van de Kuilen
(2016) documents, there is an extensive record of a measure that is loosely comparable
to our ambiguity premium in the literature using Ellsberg-like 2-urn examples, namely
the difference between the certainty equivalent of the lottery based on a draw from an
urn with a known mixture of balls with the certainty equivalent of a “lottery” based
on a draw from an urn with the unknown mixture. A limitation of this widely used
traditional measure is that it implicitly assumes that subjects know nothing about the
composition of the unknown mixture. We advance the literature by avoiding this lim-
itation, refining the measure of ambiguity premium applied and, as explained above,
by using a distinctive experimental design that allows a more realistic form of uncer-
tainty.
Our design captures two features of real world decision making. First, just as agents
are often not certain of the probability distribution over contingent states relevant
to an action, so they are also often not completely uncertain of it. Second, different
agents typically have different subjective information about the likelihoods of relevant
contingences. Our design contrasts with a more standard approach in which all subjects
are given the same, minimal, information about the contents of an “Ellsberg urn”. Our
subjects do evaluate bets on draws of a ball from the equivalent of an “Ellsberg urn”
containing a mixture of balls of different colours. But, each subject is given some
subjective and incomplete information about the determination of that mixture. For
example, a subject might have information that allows him to believe that one colour is
more likely than the other but not precisely how likely. Our design embeds treatments
and procedures intended specifically to promulgate heterogeneity of beliefs, because
our objective is to demonstrate the feasibility of measuring ambiguity sensitivity while
allowing for such heterogeneity.
The subjective, incomplete and heterogeneous nature of the information that sub-
jects have in our design about (the analogue of) the “unknown mixture” presents a
challenge as to how to impute the certainty equivalent(s) of the hypothetical ambiguity-
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neutral agent(s) when calculating ambiguity premium. We overcome the challenge by
fitting the choice data of each subject to the smooth ambiguity model (Klibanoff
et al. 2005), a preference model with the distinctive feature that it allows a para-
metric separation of belief, ambiguity attitude and risk attitude. Using estimates of
the parameters, we construct the desired imputation for each subject and thus obtain
an estimate of their ambiguity premium. The smooth ambiguity model parameter-
izes beliefs by incorporating a subjective second-order belief, making it a natural
candidate for fitting the choice data from our experiment, as we will explain. How-
ever, the fact that a second-order belief is involved is widely regarded as making the
estimation of the parameters of the smooth ambiguity model a particular challenge
(see, e.g., Wakker 2010, p. 337; Carbone et al. 2017, p. 89). We are motivated, in
part, by the goal of showing that a subject’s second-order belief can be estimated
solely through revealed preference, that is by observing his choices over first-order
acts.
Our findings suggest that our design succeeds in creating real ambiguity; that our
subjects vary in their beliefs about it and also in their attitudes to it, even allowing
for their different beliefs; and finally that, on average among our subjects, ambiguity
aversion is about as economically significant as risk aversion.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 discusses related liter-
ature. Section 3 describes the smooth ambiguity model and our experimental design.
Section 4 presents our empirical findings and Sect. 5 concludes. Appendices A–C give
more details of our experimental findings and procedures. For reasons mentioned in
Sect. 3, Appendix D briefly discusses an alternative design to the one used.
2 Related literature
In this section, we discuss other research whose main objective, like ours, is to
measure ambiguity sensitivity.1 One goal at the boundary of such research is to
try to identify the existence and direction of such sensitivity, by classifying indi-
vidual subjects as ambiguity-neutral, ambiguity-seeking or ambiguity-averse.2 Here,
we consider literature which goes beyond such typology by attempting to quantify
the strength of sensitivity. Such quantifications take two main forms in the literature:
estimation of parameters that govern ambiguity sensitivity in particular preference
1 This objective contrasts with that of the large theoretical literature, surveyed in Etner et al. (2012) and
Gilboa and Marinacci (2013), which provides models of ambiguity sensitive preferences. There is also
a growing literature whose objective is to test models or compare their empirical performances. Some
contributions in this vein provide estimates of parameters governing ambiguity sensitivity in particular
models as a by-product and are therefore discussed below. Others, such as Attanasi et al. (2014), Baillon
and Bleichrodt (2015), Binmore et al. (2012), Cubitt et al. (2017), Halevy (2007) and Hayashi and Wada
(2010), adopt more qualitative approaches to testing.
2 See the classic Ellsbergian literature surveyed by Trautmann and van de Kuilen (2016). Oechssler and
Roomets (2015, Table 1) reports the proportion of ambiguity-averse subjects from a range of studies between
1964 and 2015. See also Baillon et al. (2016b) for a recent study that includes such categorisation alongside
more refined forms of ambiguity sensitivity. Chakravarty and Roy (2009) also focuses on detection of
ambiguity aversion and seeking among their subjects, allowing that such attitudes may differ between the
domains of gains and losses.
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models; and calculation of measures akin to ambiguity premia. We consider these in
turn.3
In some cases, models of ambiguity sensitive preference are estimated primarily for
the purpose of comparing the empirical performance of the estimated models. Recent
contributions of this kind include Conte and Hey (2013), Hey et al. (2010), Hey and
Pace (2014) and Kothiyal et al. (2014). Papers that put more stress on the strength of
ambiguity sensitivity indicated by the estimated parameters include Ahn et al. (2014),
Gneezy et al. (2015) and Dimmock et al. (2015).
In Ahn et al.’s study, participants were endowed with a linear budget set
and chose how much of their endowment to allocate between three asset-
s—each formulated as a bet on a draw of a ball from an Ellsberg 3-colour
urn. Their use of this allocation task is different from our approach, in which
(as we explain below) certainty equivalents are elicited for objects more akin
to Ellsberg 2-colour urns. Also, when Ahn et al. estimate the other param-
eters of the smooth model from their data they simply assume the second-
order belief to be the uniform distribution (rather than estimate it, as we
do).
Gneezy et al. (2015) estimates a CRRA risk attitude function and the parameter α
in an α-MEU model using subjects’ evaluations of bets from draws from an Ellsberg
2-colour urn type situation where it is assumed that, “… each individual knew that the
number of balls matching her success colour lay between 0 and 100.” Our approach
also uses evaluations of bets, but is different to that of Gneezy et al. because we give
subjects more information about the likelihood of different first order probabilities
and because, in order to capture the subject’s response to that information, we use the
smooth ambiguity model rather than the α-MEU model and, thus, estimate a subjective
second-order belief for each subject.4 Besides its analytical features discussed in
Sect. 3, our choice of the smooth ambiguity model is partly motivated by the findings
of Attanasi et al. (2014) and Cubitt et al. (2017). See the latter paper’s Sect. 2 for
discussion of literature in which these models are tested.
Dimmock et al. (2015) also assesses ambiguity sensitivity by estimating a form of
α-MEU model, in which the set of probabilities is restricted to be a parametrised
neighbourhood of some reference probability whose parameter captures the sub-
ject’s degree of uncertainty about probabilities. The estimation of the latter parameter
marks a similarity to our approach to the extent that both estimate some aspect of
3 Though we concentrate on these approaches, there are others. For example, Cohen et al. (2011) and
Charness et al. (2013) report measures of strength of ambiguity sensitivity that are based neither on model
parameters nor on premia, but instead on directly-observed features of the data, such as the number of
tasks in certain sets in which an unambiguous option is chosen, or detection of other patterns in responses.
A different approach taken in some recent literature is to quantify ambiguity sensitivity using matching
probabilities. We discuss this approach in the context of studies that use matching probabilities to estimate
parameters of models.
4 Like Gneezy et al, Potamites and Zhang (2012) also measure ambiguity sensitivity through the parameter
α of the α-MEU model. These papers also have in common that they discuss in more detail than we do
the question of whether that parameter is correlated with attitude to objective risk. Stahl (2014) estimates
parameters of a bespoke logistic choice model, which he terms the βγ-model. This model has a close affinity
to the maxmin expected utility model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), which in turn is a special case of
the α-MEU model.
123
R. Cubitt et al.
beliefs about first-order uncertainty. However, there are several differences. Their
approach is to estimate parameters of a special case of the α-MEU model, whereas
we use the smooth ambiguity model. Moreover, for much of their analysis, they
suppress differences across subjects in beliefs about uncertainty, taking these to be
given by a shared neighbourhood of an assumed reference first-order probability.
In contrast, we deliberately induce heterogeneity of second-order beliefs and esti-
mate the latter separately for each subject, with only the support of such beliefs
imposed. Finally, they elicit preferences using matching probabilities whereas we
use certainty equivalents.5 The latter approach is natural given our objective, as a
subject’s ambiguity premium is defined as the difference between two certainty equiv-
alents.
We end this section by considering previous studies that have reported measures
more directly akin to the ambiguity premia that we measure. Table 3 in Camerer and
Weber (1992) lists a range of classic studies going back to Becker and Brownson (1964)
which report similar measures by implementing the Ellsberg 2-colour/2-urn example.
Essentially, they report the difference between the certainty equivalents of the bet on
the draw from the “known” urn and the draw from the “unknown” urn, expressed as
a percentage of the expected value of the objective lottery corresponding to the draw
from the known urn. More recently, Trautmann and van de Kuilen (2016) have updated
the table reported in Camerer and Weber (1992). Although they observe considerable
heterogeneity in the ambiguity (and risk) premium reported across studies, the typical
ambiguity premium is positive for all studies considered with a mean of roughly
14%, as compared to a mean risk premium of about 17%. Evidently, there is an
affinity between the older literature on ambiguity premium and the current paper, but
the older literature typically does not assume or estimate any particular model and,
as a consequence, typically no beliefs are estimated. Failing to control for different
beliefs across individuals would not be appropriate in our context because we wish
to capture heterogeneity of second-order probabilities, and allow for it in assessing
the strength of ambiguity sensitivity. Such allowance is required by the more refined
conception of ambiguity premium that we use. While Abdellaoui et al. (2011) do
estimate subjective beliefs, they concentrate on reporting ambiguity attitude in terms
of the source functions they fit their data to. While a source function is undoubtedly a
richer description of attitudes toward ambiguity, it is somewhat model specific; unlike
the ambiguity premium, it is not a measure that is readily compared across models,
nor with risk premium.
5 Matching probabilities are defined by indifferences between objective lotteries and particular ambiguous
acts. Their uses are elaborated by Dimmock et al. (2016) and Baillon et al. (2017), which assess ambiguity
sensitivity in large representative samples, and by Baillon et al. (2016a) which uses them to measure
ambiguity attitudes for natural events. As these studies and Voorhoeve et al. (2016) illustrate, matching
probabilities do not have to be used to estimate parameters of theoretical models, though that is the main
use Dimmock et al. (2015) and Baillon et al. (2017) make of them. We consider matching probabilities
further in Appendix D.
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3 The smooth ambiguity model and our experimental design
3.1 Preference representation
Formally and as is standard, we represent the agent’s possible choices as acts, i.e. as
maps from contingent states s ∈ S to consequences. In the smooth ambiguity model,
an act f is evaluated by:
Eμφ
(
E p∈P (u ( f ))
)
,
where u is a utility function measuring attitudes to objective risk, φ is an increasing
function mapping utilities to reals, and μ is a second-order subjective probability over
first order probability distributions on S. A first order probability measure is denoted by
p ∈ P . The operators Eμ and E p take expectations with respect to the measures μ and
p, respectively. Thus, μ represents the DM’s subjective uncertainty about the different
first order probability distributions she deems possible (i.e. those in P) and, in this
sense, is a second-order belief . In the model, this belief is captured by a (second-order,
subjective) probability.6 Attitudes towards ambiguity are characterized by the shape
of φ. In particular, a concave (convex) φ characterizes ambiguity aversion (seeking),
equivalently, an aversion (attraction) to mean preserving spreads in the distribution
over expected utilities that is induced jointly by μ and u. When φ is linear or μ is
degenerate, the smooth model collapses to a subjective expected utility model.
3.2 Design core I: risky and ambiguous acts
In our experiment, subjects evaluated various acts, some of which were risky and others
ambiguous. At the beginning of each session, subjects were shown some (opaque)
white bags and told that coloured balls would be drawn publicly from these bags at
the end of the session. All acts would be resolved by one of these draws and would
yield e16 if a ball of a particular colour (which would vary by act) was drawn; and
zero otherwise. Acts were presented to subjects as clauses of text of the form “if ball
is ….. e16.00; if ball is …. e0.00”, with the two placeholders filled by colours and
with a clear indication provided of which bag was referred to. Here, we report only
tasks involving acts to be resolved from bags containing balls of two colours.7
One of these white bags (denoted ‘risky bag 1’ here) was publicly filled at the
start of the experiment with 7 orange and 3 blue balls. Then, each subject’s certainty
equivalent was elicited for an act yielding e16 if an orange ball was drawn from this
bag. This procedure was repeated in an identical way with another white bag (hereafter
‘risky bag 2’), except that the contents of this bag were 3 orange and 7 blue balls. As
the contents of risky bags 1 and 2 were known to subjects, the acts for which certainty
6 Though, in the smooth ambiguity model, μ is a subjective probability, this does not imply that, in the
eyes of the model, the agent treats the composition of the first and second-order probabilities as a two-stage
lottery. For further discussion in the context of our design, see footnote 11.
7 Subjects undertook an initial practise and some further tasks not relevant to the current paper involving
bags of three colours. In this paper, we make no further mention of the irrelevant tasks.
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equivalents had been elicited up to this point were risky, but not ambiguous. In contrast,
the third and fourth acts were ambiguous, as we explain next.8
For these acts, subjects were shown a black bag (hereafter ‘the black bag’) that, as
subjects were told, contained 12 balls, all numbered either 1 or 2. Subjects were not
told the proportions of the two types of ball in the black bag. Before the elicitation of
any further certainty equivalents, a ball was publicly drawn at random from this bag
and, without its number being shown to either subjects or the experimenter, placed
in a further white bag which we will call here ‘the ambiguous bag’.9 Subjects were
told that, at the end of the experiment, the number on the ball in the ambiguous bag
would be revealed and that bag would then be filled with the contents of whichever
risky bag matched that number. Then, a final ball (which obviously would be either
orange or blue) would be drawn from the ambiguous bag. Since tasks involving bets on
orange and bets on blue were equally likely to be paid (see below), it was transparent
that ‘rigging’ the ambiguous bag would not have been in the experimenters’ interests,
even if it had been possible. More generally, it is a deliberate feature of our design that
the uncertainties associated with the ambiguous bag were resolved by well-defined,
physical events, exogenous to subjects’ behavior.
The simple and concrete nature of the procedure that determined the final contents
of the ambiguous bag was designed to make clear that those contents would be either
the contents of risky bag 1 or those of risky bag 2, thereby controlling the support (but
only the support) of subjects’ second-order beliefs. Importantly, at the point when the
relevant certainty equivalents were elicited, subjects did not know which risky bag
would provide the contents of the ambiguous bag (and, as subjects could see, nor did
the experimenters).10 Thus, acts resolved by draws from this bag were ambiguous, as
the probabilities of different colours being drawn from it were unknown.
Subjects were not told the contents of the black bag, a draw from which would
determine the contents of the ambiguous bag, but they did have some information
about this. This information was allowed to vary across subjects and manipulated
according to procedures which we describe in Sect. 3.4. First, we apply the smooth
ambiguity model to the setup just described.
3.3 Using the smooth ambiguity model to calculate ambiguity premia
As a convenient notation let, for i = 1, 2, risky bag i contain a proportion pi of orange
balls and a proportion 1 − pi of blue balls. As explained in the previous sub-section,
which of the two risky bags would be used to fill the ambiguous bag would depend on
the number on a ball drawn from the black bag whose composition was unknown to
subjects, except that it contained balls numbered 1 or 2.
8 In a pilot experiment (n  48), we found that the inferred attitudes to risk and ambiguity did not depend
significantly on the order of the tasks.
9 Bags were not described as “risky” or “ambiguous” to subjects. Instead, the white bags were identified
numerically and the black bag referred to by that name.
10 For the parenthesised part of this claim, it is important that the black bag did in fact contain some balls
of each number. A feature of the procedures explained in Sect. 3.4 is that not only was this true but subjects
also had enough information to see its truth.
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Consider, to begin with, the position of a subject not knowing the number on
the ball drawn from the black bag. Assuming smooth ambiguity preferences, the
certainty equivalent of the bet that an orange ball is drawn from the ambiguous bag,
CEAmb(orange), satisfies the following equation:
φ (u (CEAmb (orange)))  φ
(
p1u
(
c∗
)
+ (1 − p1) u (c)
)
μ + φ
(
p2u
(
c∗
)
+ (1 − p2) u (c)
)
(1 − μ) ,
where the tuple (μ, φ, u) characterizes the parameters fixing the subject’s prefer-
ences, and c∗ and c are the payoffs in case the bet succeeds or fails. (Similarly, for
CEAmb(blue), with c∗ and c transposed.) For any subject, beliefs are fully character-
ized under the smooth ambiguity model by a single parameter μ, interpretable in the
current context as the subject’s belief about the proportion of balls in the black bag
that are numbered 1, a proportion that the subjects do not know.11 Now, consider the
(hypothetical) position of a subject who did know which ball had been drawn from the
black bag, and hence which of the two risky bags would be used to fill the ambiguous
bag. (Of course, this hypothetical position is the same as the actual one of a subject
facing one of risky bags 1 or 2.) In this case, the (second-order) belief μ is degenerate
on pi, the actual proportion of orange balls in the relevant risky bag i , and the certainty
equivalent of the bet that an orange ball is drawn, CEi (orange), satisfies the following
equation:
u (CEi (orange))  pi u
(
c∗
)
+ (1 − pi ) u (c) ,
(and, again, similarly for blue).
We assume that utility is given by u(x)  x1−ρ/(1−ρ), and φ by φ(x)  −e−ϕx/ϕ.
With these specifications, the parameters ρ and ϕ represent the coefficient of rel-
ative risk aversion (CRRA) and the coefficient of absolute ambiguity aversion
(CAAA), respectively and, jointly with μ, completely parametrize a subject’s prefer-
ences.
For a subject who conforms exactly to the current assumptions and whose
certainty equivalents are observable precisely, either of the certainty equivalents
11 To see the rationale for this interpretation, recall that in the smooth ambiguity model μ is a subjective
second-order probability, capturing beliefs about uncertain first-order probabilities (which, in the current
context, are values of pi). Ambiguity aversion over first-order events in the smooth model is equivalent
to the agent behaving in a more risk averse manner over the domain of second-order events than over the
domain of lottery events: as Klibanoff et al. (2005), pp. 1852) put it, an ambiguity-averse agent (in the
model) behaves as if the second-order probability is a less reliable guess than a lottery probability. For
example, suppose a smooth ambiguity subject in our experiment has μ(p1)  0.4, i.e., reveals a subjective
probability of 0.4 for the second-order event that the proportion of orange balls in the ambiguous bag is p1.
Theoretically, this subject being ambiguity-averse is equivalent to him preferring to bet on a lottery paying
1 with probability 0.4 than to bet the same stake on the event {p1} and also preferring to bet on a lottery
paying with probability 0.6 than to bet the same stake on the event ¬{p1} Relatedly, formal results discussed
in Sect. 2.4 of Klibanoff et al. (2012) show that ambiguity of a first order event E (e.g., that an orange ball is
drawn from the ambiguous bag) implies that second-order events concerning the probability of E (e.g., the
probability of an orange ball being drawn is p1) are treated as ambiguous, in that the probability of a such
an event cannot be calibrated to a lottery probability. Thus, the expected utility evaluation of second order
acts in the smooth model does not mean that the agent treats these acts as based on unambiguous events.
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CEi (orange) or CEi (blue) would yield the parameter ρ and the two certainty equiv-
alents CEAmb (orange) and CEAmb (blue) would then provide sufficient information
to infer the remaining elements (ϕ and μ) of the parameter triple for each subject.
Apart from the functional form of the preference, the key identifying assump-
tion is that the probabilities pi that the subject considers possible are those that
the instructions tell them are possible (and which actually are those possible).
Beyond this, there is no restriction on beliefs: μ is obtained from the data, not
imposed.
In practice, we elicited certainty equivalents for acts using choice-lists presented to
subjects on computer screens. For each act, subjects were asked to make 21 choices
between the act and each of an ascending range of certain amounts grouped together in
a list, ranging from 0e to 16 e, and increasing in in equal steps of 0.80e. For a given
act, the midpoint of the last choice in which the subject chose the act and the first choice
in which the subject chose the certain amount was taken as the certainty equivalent,
when required. Since in our experimental design p2  1 − p1 we presented subjects
with choice lists from which certainty equivalents could be approximated in this way
for bets on an orange ball being drawn from each of risky bags 1 and 2, and then for
bets on each of orange and blue being finally drawn from the ambiguous bag. For
each subject individually, the resulting data was used in two ways. First, we estimated
the parameter tuple (μ, ϕ, ρ) from the choices. In particular, for each subject, we
used maximum likelihood to maximize the probability of observing the 84 choices in
the relevant choice-lists by minimizing the differences between the valuation of the
act and the valuation of the certain amount divided by a Fechnerian error term (e.g.,
Hey and Orme 1994). Second, we used the estimated parameters and the certainty
equivalents for the ambiguous acts to obtain ambiguity premia for those acts, as we
now explain.
Recall that the ambiguity premium is a hypothetical ambiguity-neutral agent’s cer-
tainty equivalent for the act minus that of the real agent, with the hypothetical agent
assumed to share the actual agent’s subjective information and attitude to objective
risk. Thus, under the smooth ambiguity model, a subject’s ambiguity premium for
the bet that an orange ball is drawn from the ambiguous bag is given by X − Y ,
where
X ≡ u−1 ((p1u
(
c∗
)
+ (1 − p1) u (c)
)
μ +
(
p2u
(
c∗
)
+ (1 − p2) u (c)
)
(1 − μ)) , and
Y ≡ CEAmb (orange) .
The term Y is directly observed, as it is the subject’s actual certainty equivalent for
the relevant ambiguous act. In contrast, the term X is not observed as it is the certainty
equivalent of the hypothetical agent. Instead, X is computed from the estimates of ρ
and μ using the fact that an ambiguity-neutral agent may be represented by setting
φ (x)  x . (The values of c* and c and, under our identifying assumption, p1 and p2
are known to the experimenter.) As the hypothetical ambiguity-neutral agent shares
the risk attitude and beliefs of the real agent, the parameters ρ and μ are reflected
in the constructed certainty equivalent X. To this extent, the ambiguity premium
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X − Y controls for risk attitude and beliefs.12 Three features of this approach are
worth stressing at this point. First, the act for which X −Y gives the subject’s ambigu-
ity premium is a first-order act, i.e. a bet on a draw from the ambiguous bag. Second,
it is our use of the smooth ambiguity model that allows us to estimate a second-order
belief parameter (μ) (with a natural interpretation in our design) and to use it in con-
structing the hypothetical agent’s certainty equivalent (X) . Third, the hypothetical
agent shares not just μ, but also attitude to risk with the real agent. Hence, in general,
X is not simply the expected value of the act, conditional on μ, p1, and p2.
3.4 Design core II: treatments and information heterogeneity
To induce heterogeneity in second-order beliefs among subjects, we used both a treat-
ment variation and a device designed to induce heterogeneity within each treatment.
The treatment variation manipulated the actual composition of the black bag. Specif-
ically, there were three treatments, each featuring a different proportion of balls in the
black bag numbered 1. This proportion was either 0.25, 0.5 or 0.75, with the varia-
tion administered between sessions. Below, we use these values as the names of the
treatments.
Different subjects within the same session could also have different information
about the black bag because, in each treatment, subjects were allowed short private
peeks into it, thereby obtaining imperfect, private signals of its contents. These peeks
were separate for each subject, with the bag being shaken by the experimenter between
peeks to ensure that each subject received a different visual signal. As well as inducing
heterogeneity, this device served to emphasise the imperfect nature of the subject’s
information about the relative likelihood of the different possible compositions of the
device that would resolve the ambiguous acts.
The existing literature is populated mostly by designs where subjects are told
nothing about the resolution of the ambiguous acts beyond the possible first-order
probability distributions (i.e., the support of the second-order distribution, as e.g., in
Gneezy et al. 2015) and designs where subjects are told everything [i.e., the entire
second-order distribution as in Halevy (2007)]. Here, we explore an information envi-
ronment that is more realistic, something in between nothing and everything.13
Perhaps the closest that the previous literature comes to our focus on incomplete and
potentially heterogeneous subjective information is the “bingo blower” design (Hey
et al. 2010; Hey and Pace 2014; Carbone et al. 2017). This design provides subjects
with incomplete information about objective probabilities via a visual impression of
a blur of moving coloured balls, one of which will be drawn. It is natural to suppose
that this gives each subject some idea of the probability that the ball drawn has a
12 Our approach obtains ambiguity premia in a particular way, based on certainty equivalents. In Appendix
D, we demonstrate the feasibility of an alternative approach to calculating ambiguity premia, using the
smooth ambiguity model and elicited matching probabilities in an otherwise similar set-up to our own. In
the alternative method, unlike in our method, both the certainty equivalents X and Y would be constructed,
rather than directly observed. Construction of X is unavoidable as it represents the hypothetical agent; but
we see it as a useful feature of our approach that it uses a directly observed Y .
13 It is possible to interpret this environment as akin to one of model uncertainty (Marinacci 2015).
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given colour and perhaps that there may be variation across subjects in this idea, for
example because of different angles or timing of view. However, as noted above, these
papers are concerned with comparison of theories, rather than calculation of ambiguity
premia. The design reported by Oechssler and Roomets (2015) also uses a mechanical
device, in their case one constructed by subjects, to generate an uncertain composition
for an Ellsberg urn. Their main concern is to classify subjects by whether they are
ambiguity-averse or not, rather than to assess the strength of ambiguity sensitivity.
3.5 Other procedures
As described above, certainty equivalents for acts were elicited with choice-lists pre-
sented to subjects on the computer screen. (Appendices B and C contain experimental
instructions and an example choice-list, respectively.) For each subject, one row of
one choice-list was randomly selected at the end of the experiment and paid out for
real. That is, if the a subject chose the certain amount in the randomly selected choice,
(s)he would receive the certain amount. Otherwise, the subject received the outcome
of the act depending on a ball drawn from the relevant bag, with all these draws made
at the end of the experiment.14
The experiment was conducted at Tilburg University with a total of 88 undergrad-
uate students, in sessions of approximately ten students. Subjects were first presented
with instructions. Then, after a practice, certainty equivalents of the various acts were
elicited and outcomes determined, as explained above. As well as receiving the out-
come of the choice selected to be for real for them, subjects received a show-up fee of
e5. All payments were made immediately in private and in cash. On average, subjects
earned e13.96. The experiment was programmed in z-tree (Fischbacher 2007).
4 Experimental results
Four subjects were excluded from the analysis because they switched multiple times
between the act and the certain option. For each of the remaining subjects, we esti-
mated the parameter tuple (μ, ϕ, ρ) and then computed ambiguity premia in the way
14 This “random lottery incentive scheme” is a standard experimental procedure which prevents confound-
ing income effects between tasks which might arise if more than one task was paid. See, for example, Cubitt
et al. (1998), Bardsley et al. (2010), Sect. 6.5) and Azrieli et al. (2016) for general discussion. Oechssler and
Roomets (2014), Bade (2015) and Baillon et al. (2015) show that an ambiguity sensitive subject could in
theory have an incentive to misrepresent their preferences, interpreted as those that would apply to choices
among ambiguous acts faced in isolation, if instead they face those tasks in a random lottery incentive
scheme. Their argument crucially assumes that the subject views the entire experiment as a single decision
problem and, in this respect, is similar to Holt’s (1986)) demonstration that the random lottery incentive
system could distort reported risk preferences if subjects violate expected utility theory in the face of objec-
tive risk. Partly in view of this, it is an open question whether the crucial assumption holds in practice. In
the case of risk, Starmer and Sugden (1991), Beattie and Loomes (1997), Cubitt et al. (1998) and Hey and
Lee (2005) tested for the effect conjectured by Holt but found little evidence for it. A similar conclusion
is reached by Oechssler et al. (2016) in the context of ambiguity. They find very little evidence of subjects
“hedging” across the underlying tasks even when the opportunity to eliminate ambiguity by doing so is
made very obvious.
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described above. Here, we report the estimated parameters first, then the ambiguity
premia.
4.1 Risk attitudes
The median estimated coefficient of relative risk aversion is equal to 0.066, revealing
significant risk aversion (p value  0.047), and in line with previous findings in the
literature (e.g., Abdellaoui et al. 2007; Ahn et al. 2014). When using the estimated
CRRA coefficient to classify subjects according to their attitude towards risk, we find
that 51.2% of subjects are risk averse, 27.4% risk seeking, and 21.4% risk neutral.15
4.2 Ambiguity attitudes and beliefs
The median estimate of the CAAA coefficient is 0.079, which is significantly larger
than zero, i.e., the median subject is significantly ambiguity-averse (p value  0.016).
Also, Mann–Whitney tests reveal that ambiguity attitudes, as captured by this param-
eter, do not differ between treatments at conventional levels of significance (treatment
0.75 vs. 0.5: p value  0.730; treatment 0.75 vs. 0.25: p value  0.092: treatment 0.5 vs.
0.25: p value  0.217). Classifying subjects on the basis of the CAAA coefficient yields
the finding that 53.57% of subjects are ambiguity-averse, 27% ambiguity-seeking, and
21.43% ambiguity-neutral.16 These numbers are broadly comparable with other simi-
lar experiments (e.g. Cohen et al. 2011; Dimmock et al. 2015; Oechssler and Roomets
2015).
We turn now to the distribution across subjects of the revealed belief μ. We find
very considerable heterogeneity of the revealed μ both across and within treatments.
This can be seen from the histograms in Fig. 1, showing the distribution of revealed
μ for each treatment, and for all subjects together. In the figure, the height of a single
bar of a histogram shows the proportion of subjects whose revealed belief lies in the
interval defining the base of the bar. Thus, for example, taking all treatments together,
27.4% of subjects revealed a value of μ in the central interval 0.45 ≤ μ ≤ 0.55; and
many of the departures from centrality are quite marked, with 28.6% of subjects in
the four outer columns.
The within treatment heterogeneity of beliefs is clear from the panels for each
treatment, with widely dispersed values of μ present in every case. This indicates that,
in each treatment, subjects could not easily infer the true proportion of balls in the
black bag numbered 1 and therefore is indirect evidence that our design did create
ambiguity, despite its structured set-up.
Yet, notwithstanding the ambiguity, the peeks did convey some information to
subjects, as is evident from the systematic way in which beliefs differ across the
three treatments in the expected directions. Mann–Whitney tests reveal that subjective
15 In particular, subjects with a CRRA higher (lower) than (minus) 0.03 were classified as being risk averse
(seeking). The remaining subjects were classified as being risk neutral.
16 In particular, subjects with a CAAA higher (lower) than (minus) 0.03 were classified as being ambiguity-
averse (seeking). The remaining subjects were classified as being ambiguity-neutral.
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Fig. 1 Revealed belief
beliefs (μ) in the treatment with objective probability 0.25 were smaller than those
in the 0.5 treatment (p value  0.004), which were in turn significantly smaller than
revealed beliefs in the treatment with objective probability 0.75 (p value  0.026).
Moreover, the panel for the 0.5 treatment shows a broadly symmetric distribution
around the true proportion of balls in the black bag numbered 1, but the panels for
treatments 0.25 and 0.75 show positive and negative skew, respectively.
Putting these points together, the peeks seem to have served their purpose as imper-
fect, private signals, conveying information, but ambiguous information. Note that it is
our use of a model in which second-order belief is separately parametrized that allows
us to report this check.
4.3 Ambiguity premia
Our main reason for estimating subjects’ second-order beliefs was to calculate their
ambiguity premia, to which we now turn. For each subject, for each of the two17
ambiguous acts, we calculated the ambiguity premium for that act using the subjective
17 Recall that we elicit CEs for a bet on orange being drawn from the ambiguous bag and also for blue.
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Fig. 2 Ambiguity premium (top) and risk premium component (bottom)
belief (μ) and attitudes towards risk (ρ) estimated for the subject, as explained at the
end of Sect. 3.3. In order to compare our results to findings in the literature, we present
our results in the form of a normalized ambiguity premium, expressing the premium
itself (for a given subject and a given ambiguous act) as a percentage of the expected
value of the act, where the expectation is calculated using the estimate of μ applicable
to the subject. The average of the two normalized ambiguity premia, so computed for
a given subject, is what we take as the ambiguity premium associated with the subject.
The top histogram of Fig. 2 shows the distribution of the ambiguity premium across
all subjects and Table 1 gives summary statistics by treatment.
As can be seen in Table 1, the resulting mean and median ambiguity premium
for all subjects taken together are approximately 7.1 and 7.0%, respectively, both
significantly different from zero. Yet, the top panel of Fig. 2 shows a large amount of
heterogeneity around these central tendencies. Though a majority of those departing
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Table 1 Ambiguity premium across treatments
Treatment All (n  84), %
0.25 (n  32), % 0.5 (n  22), % 0.75 (n  30), %
Mean 8.60* 2.36 9.07* 7.13*
Median 11.50* 4.50 9.50* 7.00*
Standard deviation 16.15 18.06 15.89 16.62
*Significantly larger than zero at the 5% significance level using a t test (for means) or Wilcoxon signed-rank
test (for medians)
from the central category do so in an upward direction, there are large departures in
both directions. On average, the strength of attitudes towards ambiguity manifested
in the ambiguity premium is somewhat lower than is typically observed in existing
studies (see Camerer and Weber 1992 and Trautmann and van de Kuilen 2016). This
might be explained by the fact that many previous studies do not estimate a model
and, more importantly, do not control for the role of (heterogeneous) beliefs, as we do.
This might have introduced an upward bias to their estimated ambiguity premium if
beliefs concerning the ambiguous event were pessimistic. From this perspective, it is
notable that we observe significant and quantitatively plausible aversion to ambiguity
even after controlling for subjective beliefs at the individual level.
Though there are some differences between treatments in raw central tendencies
of the ambiguity premium, these do not reach conventional levels of statistical sig-
nificance. Appendix A gives histograms for ambiguity premium, broken down by
treatment, providing a visual indication that any differences between treatments in
terms of ambiguity premia are quite subtle. This is encouraging, as the purpose of
the treatments was to induce heterogeneity of beliefs, not necessarily of ambiguity
premia. This is consistent with the premia reflecting attitude to ambiguity, rather than
beliefs about uncertainty, as the formula we use for ambiguity premium controls for
the subjective belief μ.
It is therefore natural to ask what difference it would have made if, instead of
estimating and controlling for μ in this way, we had simply assumed it to be uniform.
In our context, this would have amounted to assuming μ  0.5 for each subject.
Figure 3 gives the distribution across subjects of the difference between ambiguity
premium as we calculate it and the premium that would have resulted had we assumed
μ  0.5. The central column of Fig. 3 reflects the fact that, for c. 45% of subjects,
estimating μ rather than assuming it makes a difference of less than ± 2% points to
the ambiguity premium. But, for the majority the difference is larger. In fact, for 31
out of 84 subjects, the ambiguity premium with μ estimated differed from that with
μ assumed to be 0.5 by at least 5% points. This reinforces the value of estimating μ,
especially as we are concerned with the distribution of ambiguity sensitivity, not just
its central tendency.
Finally, it is interesting to compare the extent to which a subject’s evaluation of an
ambiguous act is affected by ambiguity attitude with the extent to which that eval-
uation is affected by risk attitude. Consider the overall uncertainty premium for an
act, defined as the difference between the observed certainty equivalent of act and
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Fig. 3 The impact of estimating μ
its expected value (calculated using estimated beliefs). If we subtract the ambiguity
premium from the uncertainty premium, the residual gives the extent to which the
evaluation of the act is notionally affected by the (revealed) risk and risk attitude.
Normalizing this residual by the expected value we obtain the normalized risk pre-
mium component. The distribution of this component is shown in the lower panel of
Fig. 2. The mean, median and standard deviation of this normalized risk premium
component were found to be 11.89, 5.23 and 31.80%, respectively, quite similar to
the corresponding numbers for ambiguity premium. Indeed, a signed-rank test reveals
that the normalized risk premium component is not significantly different from the
(normalized) ambiguity premium (p value  0.865). This suggests that, among the
subjects of this experiment, the strength of ambiguity sensitivity is roughly the same as
the strength of risk sensitivity, in the sense that on average they contribute in roughly
equal measure to the uncertainty premium.
However, that is not to suggest that a subject’s risk and ambiguity premium com-
ponents are positively correlated. In fact, we found a small but significant negative
correlation. This is broadly in line with some findings in the literature (e.g. Sutter
et al. 2013). However, Camerer and Weber (1992) point out most early studies find
ambiguity and risk attitudes to be largely independent; and some more recent studies,
e.g., Abdellaoui et al. (2011), and Bossaerts et al. (2009) find a significant positive
correlation.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper reports an experimental investigation into the strength of ambiguity sensi-
tivity, based on using choices to elicit individuals’ certainty equivalents for uncertain
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acts to be resolved by a variation on the famous Ellsberg 2-colour, 2-urn example;
and then using the resulting data to calculate each subject’s ambiguity premium for
each uncertain act. The choices were fitted to the smooth ambiguity model yielding
estimates, subject-by-subject, of the three parameters of that model, one governing
each of: the (second-order) belief, ambiguity attitude, and risk attitude. The parameter
estimates were applied to deconstruct each subject’s certainty equivalent for a given
uncertain act into an ambiguity premium component and a risk premium component.
The presence of a second-order belief in the parametrisation offered by the smooth
ambiguity model is crucial to this exercise.
In our setting, subjects are not faced with an Ellsberg urn and told nothing more
about it than the possible compositions. Instead, by design, they have some, but hetero-
geneous and imprecise, information about the likelihoods of different compositions,
making the setting more realistic in this respect. We find that the median ambiguity
premium is 7%. Though this figure is lower than some of those in previous literature,
it is economically significant and of the same order of magnitude as the median risk
premium component (5.2%). Moreover, we find a wide variation in ambiguity premia
between subjects, indicating a corresponding variation in ambiguity attitude, since
our measure controls for the substantial heterogeneity of beliefs that we also find.
The existence of variation in ambiguity attitude is economically significant in its own
right, because it indicates scope for ambiguity-sharing as well as the risk-sharing that
is typically taken to account for much of the activity of the modern financial economy.
The heterogeneity of second-order beliefs that we find is also important as it reinforces
our claim that subjects faced real ambiguity in our design.
Besides these findings, we also demonstrate the feasibility of using the framework
of the smooth ambiguity model and data on decisions involving first-order acts to
control for subjects’ second-order beliefs about the uncertainty facing them, when
quantifying their sensitivity to that uncertainty; and we give a numerical indication of
the value of doing so. For more than half of our subjects, controlling for beliefs alters
our computation of their ambiguity premium by 2 or more percentage points, relative
to the figure we would have obtained if we had followed previous studies in assuming
uniform beliefs.
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Appendix A: Ambiguity premium by treatment
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Appendix B: Instructions
Key to readers of paper: The instructions given below are those used in the exper-
imental sessions. The following translates the terminology used in the paper to that
used in the instructions:
“Risky bag 1” of the paper is “Bag 1” of the experimental instructions.
“Risky bag 2” of the paper is “Bag 2” of the experimental instructions.
The “ambiguous bag” of the paper is “Bag 6” of the experimental instructions.
The “black bag” of the paper is the “black bag” of the experimental instructions.
The experiment also included tasks not relevant to the present paper, involving
“bags 3, 4, 5 and 7” of the experimental instructions. Passages of the instructions
that relate only to these tasks are omitted below, except for indicators of where these
passages were. The non-bold text below was distributed to subjects on paper and read
aloud by the experimenter. The bold text comprises instructions to the experimenter
and was not given to subjects.
Instructions
As subjects arrive:
Check them against list of participants. When all arrived or start-time reached,
close door read the following preliminary announcement:
Welcome to the CentER Experimental Laboratory. Thank you for coming to this
experiment, which is part of a joint research project by staff at the Universities of
Nottingham, Oxford and Tilburg.18 In a moment, I will tell you more about it, but first
I need to set some ground-rules.
Please switch off your mobile phones. Do not attempt to use the computers for any
purpose other than the experiment.
If you encounter a difficulty during the experiment, for example, if there is anything
you do not understand, you’re welcome to ask a question. But, rather than calling out,
please raise your hand and one of us will come to attend to you. Please do not attempt
to solve your difficulty by looking at the computer screens of other participants.
We expect that the experiment will take about 1 h, but it may take a little more or
less than that. It is essential that participants stay till the end. If you are not able to do
so, please say so now.
At the end of the experiment, we will pay you a fixed sum of 5 EUR for attending,
provided you complete all the tasks and a short questionnaire. In addition, the exper-
imental tasks will give you the chance to receive a further payment. How large that
payment is will depend partly on your own decisions and partly on chance. No subject’s
decisions will affect the payment received by any subject other than themselves.
Here we have a deck of cards. The numbers on the cards correspond to seats in
the laboratory. Please take a card and be seated at the computer corresponding to the
number on the card.
18 Note to readers of the paper: this information reflected the employment of the authors at the time of the
experiment, though not the time of writing.
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When everybody is seated, read the following aloud:
I am now going to read you some instructions for the tasks. There is a copy of those
instructions on your desk that you may consult at any time.
Opening description
During the experiment, you will make several choices, involving amounts of money
and chances. At the end of the experiment, your computer will select one of your
choices at random for payment. You will be paid on the basis of what you chose in
that task, after any chances have been resolved.
Note that, although only one choice will actually determine the payment we make
to you, it could be any of the choices. Thus, every choice you make could affect your
payment. Whatever payment you are due will be paid to you in cash at the end of the
experiment in private.
Each task is a choice between two options. Some of the options yield amounts of
money that depends on the colour of a ball drawn at random from a white bag like this
one, containing balls like these. [Show bag and balls.]
We will use seven different bags, labelled 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7. Each white bag will
contain a set of coloured balls that may differ in their composition from bag to bag.
At the end of the experiment, we will actually draw one ball from each of the white
bags.
Description of a choice list
The choices will be grouped together in lists that you will see on your computer screen.
Here is a screenshot of an example choice list:
Written version of instructions has a screenshot of an example choice list
involving a risky bag X with 5 orange balls, 5 blue balls, and 5 green balls.
This is not one of the actual choice lists from the experiment, but just an example
to show you their format.
The list consists of several choice tasks. Each choice is described on one line of the
table and is between two options: Option A and Option B.
Option A yields an amount of money that depends on the colour of a ball drawn
from bag X whereas Option B yields a particular amount of money for sure.
For example, in Choice 11, Option A yields 10 EUR if the ball drawn from bag X
is orange and zero if it is blue or green; whereas Option B yields 5 EUR for sure. So,
if Choice 11 was the task selected to determine your payment, you would be paid 5
EUR, if you chose Option B; and either 10 EUR or zero, depending on the colour of
the ball drawn from bag X at the end of the experiment, if you chose Option A.
There are several points that you should note about the structure of a choice list.
At the top of the choice list, you can see information about the contents of the bag.
In this example, this information tells you that bag X contains 5 orange balls, 5 blue
balls, and 5 green balls.
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Now look at the options. Note that Option A is the same for each choice in the list.
In this example, it always yields 10 EUR if the ball drawn from the bag is orange and
zero if it is blue or green.
In contrast, Option B yields a particular amount of money for sure. Note that this
amount of money is different in each choice in the list. In the first choice, it is zero.
But, the amount rises in even steps as you move down the choice list. In the final choice
in the list, the sure amount of money given by Option B is equal to the maximum that
can be won under Option A.
We imagine that most people will choose Option A for some of the choices in the list
and Option B for others. In particular, for this example, we imagine that most people
would choose Option A in Choice 1 since, in that choice, Option A gives a chance
of a sum higher than zero, whereas Option B gives zero for sure. We also imagine
that, as the amount of money offered by Option B rises, most people would switch to
Option B at some point. In this example, by Choice 21, Option B gives 10 EUR for
sure, whereas Option A only gives a chance of 10 EUR. So, we imagine most people
would choose Option B in Choice 21. Note, however, that it is entirely up to you when
to switch from Option A to Option B and, indeed, what to do in each of the choices.
Just remember that each one of the choices could prove to be the one that determines
the payment you receive; at the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly
select one choice list and one of your choices from that list for payment. You will be
paid on the basis of what you chose in that task, after any chances have been resolved.
The way that you complete a choice list is by using your mouse to select either
Option A or Option B, in the right-hand column for each choice on the list. You
cannot continue to the next list until you have selected an option for every choice.
Once you have done this and are satisfied with your choices, click on the Continue
button to proceed. Note that, once you have clicked on Continue, you will not be able
to change your choices.
You will complete several choice lists during the experiment. They will differ from
each other, but will all have the same basic structure. In particular, although the options
will vary from list to list, the outcome of Option A will always depend on a draw from
a bag, whereas Option B will always be a sure amount of money. Within each list,
Option A will be the same on each row, whereas Option B will rise from zero in even
steps to the maximum that can be won under Option A.
There are a number of points that will vary from one choice list to another. In
particular, the composition of the bag and the information that you have about the
composition will vary from one choice list to another. Also, the winning-colour under
Option A will vary. You should pay attention to all these points, for each choice list.
Are there any questions at this moment?
Allow a moment for questions. Then proceed to …..
Construction of BAG 1
All right, here is a white bag, which we will call Bag 1. I am going to place 7 orange
balls and 3 blue balls in BAG 1. [Show balls and put in the bag. On whiteboard,
write “Bag 1 = 7 orange and 3 blue balls”.] When the time comes to draw a ball
from Bag 1, I will ask one of you to randomly draw a ball from the bag. Your computer
will now display some choice lists involving Bag 1. Please complete them at your own
pace.
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Construction of BAG 2
All right, here is another white bag, which we will call Bag 2. I am going to place
3 orange balls and 7 blue balls in BAG 2. [Show balls and put in the bag. On
whiteboard, write “Bag 2 = 3 orange and 7 blue balls”.] When the time comes to
draw a ball from Bag 2, I will ask one of you to randomly draw a ball from the bag.
Your computer will now display some choice lists involving Bag 2. Please complete
them at your own pace.
[Note to readers of the paper: For brevity, we omit the portion of instructions
relating to tasks not reported in this paper. These instructions used three more risky
bags, numbered 3, 4 and 5 at this point.]
Construction of BAG 6
Here is another white bag, which we will call Bag 6. You will not know for sure
how many balls of each colour will be put in Bag 6, until the time comes to draw a
ball from it. At that time, Bag 6 will be filled with the contents of either Bag 1 or Bag
2.
Which bag it is, will be determined as follows.
You can see that I have a black bag here. The black bag is filled with numbered
balls. Each ball in the black bag has a number on it, either 1 or 2. I am not going to
tell you how many balls there are of each number, but in a second, I will come to your
table and allow each of you to take a 5-second peak in the black bag. You can look in
the bag, but are not allowed to touch it or try to empty it out. Between each peak, I
will shake the bag.
After you have all taken your peak in the black bag, I will draw one of the numbered
balls from it, at random and without looking, and will put that ball into Bag 6. When
the time comes to draw a coloured ball from Bag 6, I will first remove the numbered
one from it and one of you will read aloud the number on that ball. If the number is
1, I will fill Bag 6 with the contents of Bag 1; and, if the number is 2, I will fill Bag
6 with the contents of Bag 2. One of you will then draw a coloured ball from Bag 6.
Thus, when the coloured ball is drawn from it, Bag 6 will have the contents of either
Bag 1 or Bag 2. However, none of us will know in advance which of those contents it
will be.
[On whiteboard, write: “Bag 6 = EITHER Bag 1 or Bag 2”.]
I will now come to your table and allow each of you to take a 5-second peak in the
black bag.
[Allow for peaks]
[Draw ball and put into bag 6]
Your computer will now display some choice lists involving Bag 6. Please complete
them at your own pace.
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[Note to readers of the paper: For brevity, we omit the portion of instructions
relating to tasks not reported in this paper. These instructions used another ambiguous
bag, numbered 7, at this point.]
Drawing of balls
Thank you for completing the choice tasks. I will now ask one of you to draw balls
from bags 1 till 5, and type the result in the computer… first bag 1.
Drawing balls from bags 1 to 5. Type results in on computer.
Now I will reveal the balls in bags 6 and 7, fill each of them with the contents of the
bag corresponding to the number of the ball, and ask one of you to draw a ball from
each of the bags.
Reveal balls, fill bag 6–7, draw balls and type in on computer.
Your computer will now display the results of the draws, the task that was elected
for payment and your earning. If you have read them, you can click on continue.
Paying out
[Computer reveals, for each subject, the choice that is real for them; what they
chose and the outcome. Computer adds show-up fee.]
Okay, while I make the receipts, we would like you to fill in a short questionnaire.
[When they have completed the questionnaire, subjects are asked to remain
seated until their seat number is announced. Then, they are asked to stand up
and walk to the pay-out table, bringing their seat number with them.]
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Appendix C: Example choice list
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Appendix D: An alternative method
An alternative empirical strategy for identifying our preference parameters to the one
that we have used in this paper would be to apply a matching probability method, akin
to one explored in recent literature (e.g., Baillon and Bleichrodt 2015; Dimmock et al.
2015, 2016).
To illustrate what this alternative empirical strategy would have constituted, con-
sider the two risky bags used in the experiment (i.e., risky bag 1 filled with 7 orange
balls and 3 blue balls and risky bag 2 filled with 3 orange balls and 7 blue balls),
and the ambiguous bag (i.e. a bag which may have either the contents of bag 1
or of bag 2). In addition, let us consider the ambiguous act that yields e16 if an
orange ball is drawn from the ambiguous bag, and the ambiguous act that yields e16
if a blue ball is drawn from the ambiguous bag, as in our experiment. The match-
ing probability of an ambiguous act for event E is defined as the probability P that
makes the decision-maker indifferent between receiving ex with (known) probability
P and receiving ex if event E occurs. In the current setting, the matching probabil-
ity of each ambiguous event (i.e., of the events “an orange ball is drawn from the
ambiguous bag” and “a blue ball is drawn from the ambiguous bag”) can be elicited
in a straightforward manner by letting subjects make a series of choices between
a risky act yielding either e16 or nothing with probability q and each of the two
ambiguous acts, where q varies between 0 and 1 and observing the value of q that
leads to indifference between the risky and the ambiguous act. Let us denote the
matching probabilities of the two ambiguous acts by PAmb(orange) and PAmb(blue),
respectively. Since expected utilities are linear in probabilities, the smooth ambiguity
model guarantees that, with the normalization u (c∗) ≡ 1 and u (c∗) ≡ 0, these two
matching probabilities imply φ ((PAmb (orange)))  φ (0.7) μ + φ (0.3) (1 − μ) and
φ ((PAmb (blue)))  φ (0.3) μ + φ (0.7) (1 − μ), respectively. So, if one assumes a
parametric form for φ like we do, one can calculate the value of parameters ϕ,μ, and
separately, ρ from the risky choices. Then, one would proceed to construct the pre-
dicted certainty equivalents X and Y defined in Sect. 3.3, using the values of ϕ,μ, and
ρ so obtained. Unlike in our method of Sect. 3.3 (where only the certainty equivalent
of the hypothetical ambiguity-neutral agent (X) was constructed but Y was measured
directly), both X and Y would be constructed in the alternative method just sketched.
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